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inety eight percent of small businesses do not utilize equity 
funding (Bates 1990), making debt a pivotal source of 
capital. Examining the underdevelopment and poverty of 
many urban areas, it is reasonable to question if an increase of 
available capital benefits these areas. While loans may be necessary 
to build wealth, they may not always be beneficial. Loans could 
benefit areas by increasing capital to fuel growth or, conversely, serve 
as an unnecessary debt burden.  Using data on loans from the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), this paper examines if the 
number of small business loans in a county affects the wages of its 
residents. 
 The Community Reinvestment Act enacted by "Congress in 1977 
. . . is intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the 
credit needs of the communities in which they operate."1 Banks are 
subsequently rated according to how well they serve their community 
and given a rating of Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or 
Substantial Non-Compliance. The rules for these rankings are not 
standardized and may vary across banks, regulators, communities, 
and situations (Garrison and Lawrence 1995). However, the rankings 
are made public and are considered in bank requests of government 
approval (e.g., a merger or acquisition) and subsequently serve as an 
incentive for banks to seek a high rating. One way a bank can 
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increase this rating is  by lending to small businesses, the thought 
being that as small businesses of a community are given access to 
capital, the businesses will grow and benefit the surrounding 
community. Indeed, small businesses receive a large portion, 18.75 
percent, of their capital from banks (Berger and Udell 1995). 
 Do small business loans actually benefit a community? An 
inverse relationship between small business loans and the income of 
an area would suggest that small business loans are not benefitting 
communities. Conversely, a positive relationship may be cause to 
incentivize more small business loans. Not only do policy makers and 
small business owners have a stake in this question, in the form of 
improving their communities, but banks as well. As communities 
develop, default rates may decline and loans will be more profitable. 
 To estimate the relationship between small business loans and the 
growth of a community, I collected data from the IRS, CRA, and 
Census. The annual wages in a county are regressed against the 
number of loans originated in that year, controlling for poverty and 
population. This model demonstrates the effects of small business 
loans in counties, accounting for the size of the loan as well as the 
current economic development of the county, accounted for by 
poverty rate. I find that small business loans' ability to increase 
county wages varies depending on the type of county, with small 
counties demonstrating a positive effect and large counties a negative 
effect. 
 
Literature Review        
 
The efficacy of the Community Reinvestment Act is not agreed 
upon (Hylton and Rougeau 1997). The importance of small business 
loans to small businesses and the community can be seen in the 
dependency small businesses have on debt capital and relationship 
lending. Berger and Udell (2002) examine bank lending to small 
institutions, specifically how relationship based lending (versus a 
more metric based approach) functions between the banking industry 
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and small businesses. They, along with others (Chittendon 1996; 
Bates 1990), emphasize the importance commercial bank lending 
plays in the role of small business financing--it accounts for, on 
average, 18.75 percent of small business financing. Given this 
importance, Berger and Udell seek to explore the methods by which 
banks evaluate small business credit worthiness.  
 Berger and Udell create four evaluation methods, one of which is 
relationship-based lending. Their paper explores changes that can 
restrict or make more available financing under the basis of 
relationship-based lending. Their paper concludes that as the banking 
industry consolidates, relationship based lending will become more 
scarce and financing to small businesses more difficult, as banks will 
become much more institutionalized with more degrees of separation 
from the small businesses. Given this relationship-based approach 
between small businesses and banks, it is worth examining if small 
business lending is actually beneficial.  
 In addition to the necessity of loans to small businesses, lending 
may not be profitable in many areas. Economist Michael Porter posits 
the difficulty of effective lending in urban areas (Porter 1995). In 
regards to small business loans, Porter claims that lack of debt 
financing is a pervasive problem in the inner city, as these loans are 
only "marginally profitable." However, Porter notes that the 
Community Reinvestment Act has heightened lending competition in 
the inner city and, in some cases such as Boston, it is profitable. To 
take a broader view of this article, Porter maintains that inner city 
areas can be revitalized but only through catering to the strengths of 
the inner city which can be applied outside of the inner city, not by 
catering to strengths that exist outside of the inner city and attempting 
to internalize them. In order for this goal of an "exporting" the inner 
city to be realized, Porter claims that capital need be made available 
to urban, inner city areas. This will aid in creating an inner city that 
can serve its populace and the other populaces profitably.  
 Given Porter's claim that debt financing would improve the inner 
city, my topic seems an apt one. Will providing financing in an area 
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improve the wages of the residents? If so, it seems Porter's claim is 
founded. If not, perhaps another source of capital and stimulus need 
be considered for urban funding, such as equity or subsidies (to 
Porter's chagrin, he maintains that government subsidies often 
introduce businesses to an inner city area that cannot viably operate in 
the long-run).2  While Porter notes that the CRA might find difficulty 
in revitalizing communities and others note the poor implementation 
of the associated bank ranking system (Garrison 1995), viewpoints 
exist that support its continuance (Hylton and Rougeau 1997). This 
paper estimates the effect the CRA has on communities in the form of 




 The primary economic 
theory underpinning my 
empirical analysis is the 
Theory of a Multiplier 
Effect. This effect describes 
how an initial influx of 
money creates more value 
than its original injection 
due to a multiplicative 
circulation. The Multiplier 
Effect suggests that 
spending and investment 
will beget more spending 
and investment.  In the 
context of small business loans, a single small business loan will 
multiply to an investment in the community larger than the size of the 
original loan. This growth is illustrated in the labor market. An initial 
loan will increase the size of a small business, which will 
subsequently need to hire more workers, increasing the demand for 




XJUR / July 2015 
 
50 
This initial stimulus raises the wages of workers, allowing for 
additional spending in the community. In turn, there arises a need for 
more workers to produce the newly demanded goods and services in 
the community. This shift in labor demand even further from D' to D'' 
raises wages from their initial position at W to a final position at W'' 
(Figure 2). This growth in wages and the quantity of labor is beyond 
the initial business loan.  
The magnitude of the multiplier effect is determined by the 
marginal propensity to consume, or how much of every additional 
dollar earned a wage-earner will spend. The Multiplier Effect can also 
illustrate decreases, as some of my data illustrates. A negative 
multiplier would demonstrate that a stimulus is harming the labor 
market by causing labor demand to shift left. This would imply there 
is something inherently harmful in the stimulus. 
Data 
 
 To examine the effect of loans on wages, I collect data from 
various sources. The CRA website reports small business loan 
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same years, I collect wages from the IRS and county poverty and 
population from the US Census Bureau. Summary statistics for these 




The summary statistics pertain to 88 Ohio counties over seven 
years for a total of 616 observations. Total number of loans is the 
total number of business loans in a given county year, combining the 
number of small, medium, and large small business loans. This serves 
as the primary regressor. Wages are measured as total county wages, 
as reported on form 1040 by the individuals of a county, for a county 
and year. The poverty rate measures the number of all individuals in a 
county year in poverty over the number of total individuals in that 
county year. It should be noted that in the loan categories, as well as 
in total wages and population, the three largest Ohio cities' counties  
(Hamilton-Cincinnati, Franklin-Columbus, Cuyahoga-Cleveland) 









Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max Maximum
Total Number of Loans 2515.6 5175.4 33.0 48020.0
Number of Small SB Loans 2332.3 4857.9 30.0 46225.0
Number of Medium SB Loans 88.5 166.3 0.0 1088.0
Number of Large SB Loans 94.8 194.4 0.0 1239.0
Wages (Thousands of $s) 2217429.0 3918968.0 131431.0 24700000.0
Poverty Rate 14.2 4.7 4.2 35.0
Population 131015.8 212082.6 13219.0 1305273.0
n=616
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Empirical Model and Results 
 
 Using the data from the following section I construct a model to 
estimate total county wages in a year.  My model estimates total 
wages in a county and year using the following regression 
specification: 
 
yit=β0+β1 (Number of Loansit)+ β2 (Poverty Rateit)+ β3 
(Populationit)+ δt + τi + Uit   
 
The variable yit is the total wages in a county for a given year; β1 
estimates how an additional loan in county i and year t affects the 
total wages in that county and year, in thousands. The coefficient β2 
estimates the change in thousands of dollars of county wages that a 
1percent increase in poverty rate has on county i in time period t; β3 
estimates the effect of increasing population by one will have on 
thousands of dollars of total wages in a county year; δt and τi account 
for origination year and county fixed effects respectively. The 




DV: Wages in County-Year All Counties










Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 
Regression of all county years 
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DV:Total Wages in County-Year with loans<600 with loans=>600
Number of Loans 54.2*** -58.6***
(12.7) (18.3)








Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The coefficient in Table 4 indicates that additional small business 
loans decrease total wages of a county by $57,200 on average, 
holding poverty rate and population constant. The coefficient on loans 
is significant at the one percent level. This produces an unexpected 
result with a theoretical model that typically predicts growth.  
To explore this result further, I divide counties into two sections 
based on loan volume. Table 5 illustrates differences in "small" and 
"large" counties. I define small counties as counties with less than an 
average of 600 loans over the seven year period while big counties 




This stratification illustrates that small business loans appear to be 
associated with decreasing wages in large counties and increasing 
wages in small counties. On average, an increase of one small 
business loan in a small county leads to wages increasing by $54,200. 
In large counties, however, an additional loan creates a decline of 
$58,600. Both results are significant at the one percent level. 
Table 5 
Regression with divided counties specified 




Dollar Amount Results 
 This result is also consistent across the dollar amount of the loans, 
which is calculated by substituting the total dollar amount of loans for 
the number of loans in the regression model. This yields the results of 
Table 6. Across all counties the model estimates a dollar loaned 
decreases total wages by $1.30. This result holds for large counties, 
but small counties have an estimated $1.54 gain for every dollar 
loaned to small businesses. This supports the claim that small 
business loans may have a positive effect in small counties and 
negative effect in large counties due to the negative coefficient for 
large counties and positive for small counties. This illustrates a 






 The criticism of the effect of the data capturing county wages 
before the small business loans were made might also arise. Reverse 
causality might arise if a large number of loans are originated at the 
end of a year and the effects not seen until the following recording 
period for wages. To account for this the total loan number of each 
county was lagged one year. The results are reported in Table 7.  
 
DV: Total Wages All  Counties with loans<600 with loans>=600
Amount of Dollars Loaned -1.30*** 1.54*** -1.31
(0.37) (0.52) (1.62)
Poverty Rate 2,155 -754 810
(9,273) (676) (9,695)
Population 11.5*** -5.25 11.6
(2.29) (4.10) (11.2)
Constant -154,170 434,765*** 8.85e+06
(227,316) (115,487) (1.39e+07)
Observations 616 175 441
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






These results illustrate consistent results with loans in the same 
year; small business loans in big counties have an estimated negative 
effect and small counties a positive effect.  These results also support 
the claim that small business loans originated in large counties harm 






 The mechanism by which the effect of small business loans hurt 
or harm wages, depending on the county size in which the loan is 
originated, remains unclear. This may occur because small counties 
promote a more intimate lending environment where loans are not 
originated to small business that might perform poorly. By contrast, 
large counties may contain an environment of anonymity that allows 
small business loans to be obtained even by businesses that will not 
prosper. Small counties may have a better grasp on how successful 
DV: Total County Wages All  Counties with loans<600 with loans>=600
Lagged Number of Loans -79.3*** 32.3** -80.6***
(12.5) (13.9) (12.9)
Poverty Rate -4,395 -94.2 -5,260
(5,140) (655) (7,619)
Population 10.8 -9.99** 10.9*
(6.72) (4.22) (6.49)
Constant 91,296 581,008*** 11400000
(220,912) (119,982) (8260000)
Observations 528 150 378
R-squared 0.998 0.996 0.998
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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loan recipients will be because they are more familiar with the habits 
of the loan recipient. If this is the case, it would illustrate the 
importance of relationship-based lending over an automated metric-
based approach because the relationship based lending of small 
counties would be proved superior to the anonymity of larger 
counties. The results illustrate an inherent difference in small and 
large counties; what this difference is may be the subject that can 
guide further policy or revision of current policy. 
 The importance of determining the efficacy of small business is 
important as it not only will serve to guide policy, but may determine 
what kind of capital is available to small businesses. If small 
businesses cannot aid the community through debt financing, it might 
be wise to consider policy that would raise their ability to gain equity 
financing. The result of the empirical model, estimating a detrimental 
effect of small business loan originations in large counties and a 
positive effect in small counties, may prompt a rethinking of policy 
toward credit accessibility. Perhaps policy advocating increases in 
small business loans should be redirected to small counties and 
eliminated from large ones, which would require a revision of current 
Community Reinvestment Act and other similar policies to account 
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